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THE COURT’S POWER TO GRANT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN CASES WHERE 
ARBITRATION IS PENDING 
By 




In Janvey v. Alguire, the Fifth Circuit was forced to confront the circuit 
split regarding a court’s ability to exercise its equitable powers in granting 
injunctive relief while an order to compel arbitration is pending.1 Janvey is the 
latest case in the saga of Courts trying to reconcile the Federal Arbitration Act’s 
policy favoring arbitration with the Court’s traditional equitable role.2 Preliminary 
injunctive relief is used to prevent injury while a case is pending; however, this 
remedy is problematic when it involves the interaction of the public court system 
and a private agreement to arbitrate.3 Courts considering a motion for preliminary 
injunction while arbitration is pending face a dilemma accompanied by unclear 
jurisprudence. 
Even without the added question of arbitration, proving the requisite 
elements necessary to receive a preliminary injunction can be a daunting task. A 
plaintiff must establish four elements: 
 
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a 
substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not 
issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is 
denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction 
                                                 
* Dwight A. Decker, Jr. is a 2012 Juris Doctor candidate of the Dickinson School of Law, 
Pennsylvania State University. 
1 Janvey v. Alguire, 628 F.3d 164, 172 (5th Cir. 2010). 
2 Id. at 173. 
3 Id. 




is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not 
disserve the public interest.4 
 
An individual need not show that he or she will win his or her case but in order to 
satisfy the first element he or she must demonstrate a prima facie case.5 
Traditionally, the second element of irreparable harm applies where monetary 
damages are not adequate, but may also be used to prevent the dispensation of 
corporate funds so as to prevent insolvency.6 The third and fourth elements require 
the court to balance the interests of both parties and the public.7 Only after these 
four elements are addressed may the court then evaluate the appropriateness of 
injunctive relief in regard to arbitration.8 
 
II. THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
 
 In Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., a contract dispute arose between a 
semiconductor supplier and a laser manufacturer.9 The district court granted a 
preliminary injunction, enjoining Mostek from selling the bulk of its assets and 
rendering itself judgment proof.10 The injunction Teradyne requested was granted 
pending the outcome of arbitration.11 The First Circuit, following the precedents of 
the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits and declining to follow the Eighth 
Circuit, held that preliminary injunctive relief is proper in order to preserve the 
status quo even in the face of arbitration.12  
                                                 
4 Id. at 174. 
5 Id. 
6 Janvey, 628 F.3d at 179-80. 
7 Id. at 180. 
8 Id. at 181. 
9 Teradyne, Inc. v.  Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d  43, 45 (1st  Cir. 1986). 
10 Id. at 52.  
11 Id. at 45. 
12 Id. at 51. 
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The First Circuit, like all courts faced with the question of whether to grant 
injunctive relief in the face of pending arbitration, must reconcile its holding with 
the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp.13 In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court espoused a 
federal objective of favoring arbitration regardless of state law.14 The First Circuit 
found, that unlike in Moses H. Cone, the process of arbitration was not affected in 
Teradyne because a party sought to stay arbitration in Moses H. Cone, whereas 
here, a party sought to preserve a remedy pending a ruling on whether arbitration 
was to be compelled.15 By preserving the status quo in granting preliminary 
injunctive relief where the appropriate elements are met, the court believed it was 
preserving the meaningfulness of arbitration and was thus is in line with the 
Congressional intent of the Federal Arbitration Act.16 
 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Salvano, the Seventh 
Circuit addressed a courts ability to grant injunctive relief in a case where 
arbitration was pending.17 Salvano involved a dispute in which employees of 
Merrill Lynch resigned in favor of employment with a new firm; Merrill Lynch 
subsequently sought an injunction preventing the now ex-employees from 
soliciting clients or disclosing client information.18 Merrill Lynch obtained the 
injunction sought, which Salvano attempted to have dismissed a number of times 
                                                 
13Id. at 49 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 22 (1983)). 
14 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 2D ED., 106 
(Thomson/West 2009). 
15 Teradyne, 797 F.2d at 49-50. 
16 Id. at 51. 
17 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Salvano, 999 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
18 Id. 




during the course of arbitration.19 Merrill Lynch proved the requisite elements to 
obtain an injunction and the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s 
contention that granting a preliminary injunction preserves the meaningfulness of 
arbitration.20 This preliminary injunction, like the others discussed infra, was 
applicable only for the period leading up to the point where arbitration was 
compelled.21 
 
IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
 
 In another case involving Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, the Eighth Circuit addressed nearly identical issue as the 
Seventh Circuit in Salvano.22 The Court in Hovey first addressed the issue of 
arbitrability before addressing the appropriateness of injunctive relief.23 As a 
member of the New York Stock Exchange, Merrill Lynch was required to submit 
its dispute with Hovey to arbitration as per rule 347 of the New York Stock 
Exchange.24 The Eighth Circuit focused first on the question of arbitrability before 
addressing the preliminary injunction, finding that arbitration agreements should 
be construed liberally so that doubt regarding the scope of the arbitration 
agreement should be construed in favor of arbitration.25 Unlike the Seventh Circuit 
in Salvano, the Eighth Circuit held that where a dispute is arbitrable, the court must 
look to the terms of the agreement in order to determine the appropriateness of 
granting a preliminary injunction.26 The injunction was viewed as an undue delay 
                                                 
19 Id. at 213. 
20 Id. at 214. 
21Id. at 216. 
22 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey 726 F.2d 1286, 1287 (7th Cir. 
1993).  
23 Id. at 1288. 
24 Id. at 1288. 
25 Id. at 1289, 1292 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)). 
26 Id. at 1292. 
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or obstruction placed on arbitration by the courts and therefore runs contrary to the 
purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act.27 The determinative issue for the Eight 
Circuit was the actual agreement to arbitrate.28 Unlike RGI v. Tucker, discussed 
below, the contract in Hovey was silent on the issue or preliminary injunctions.29 
These two issues, the Federal Arbitration Acts liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration and the lack of agreement by the parties, led the Eighth Circuit to 
conclude that preliminary injunctive relief under this situation is improper.30 
 It should be noted that the Eighth Circuit may uphold a preliminary 
injunction in cases where the end result is to possibly shorten the time it takes to 
compel arbitration.31 
 
V. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
 
 The Fifth Circuit addressed the same issues presented in Hovey when it 
decided RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assocs., Inc. but distinguished its ruling based on 
the facts.32 In RGI the Navy contracted with Tucker & Assocs. to manage 
personnel records and Tucker subcontracted part of its work out to RGI.33 After an 
investigation, it was discovered that RGI was in violation of the Federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act; Tucker & Assocs. withheld payment to RGI pending an audit an 
RGI brought suit to compel arbitration.34 Unlike in Hovey, the parties in RGI laid 
out specific terms regarding the availability of injunctive relief within their 
contract.35 The contract provided in relevant part: 
 
                                                 
27 Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1993). 
28 Id. at 1291. 
29 Id. at 1291. 
30 Id. at 1292. 
31 In re Y & A Group Securities Litigation, 38 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 1994). 
32 RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assocs., Inc., 858 F.2d 227, 230 (5th  Cir. 1988). 
33 Id. at  228. 
34 Id. at 228. 
35 Id. at 230. 




In the event that a dispute is submitted for arbitration 
pursuant to this paragraph, this Subcontract shall continue in 
full force and effect until such decision is rendered . . . If the 
Contractor has capability to honor such invoices it shall 
make such payments as required and the Subcontractor 
services shall continue until such time as a decision is 
rendered under this article.36 
 
This distinction allowed the Fifth Circuit to address the same issues contemplated 
by the Salvano and Hovey courts without taking a position or favoring a 
jurisdiction.37 Allowing injunctive relief in RGI preserved the status quo as 
contemplated by the parties, and did not contravene the purposes of the Federal 
Arbitration Act because the Court simply enforced what was already agreed upon 
by the parties.38 
 The Fifth Circuit re-addressed the issue of granting a preliminary 
injunction while arbitration is pending in the recent case of Janvey v. Alguire. This 
case arises out of a Securities and Exchanges Commission investigation that 
uncovered an alleged multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme.39 The victims of this 
alleged Ponzi scheme sought to freeze what assets were remaining in order to 
preserve the availability of some measure of damages.40 In Janvey, the court faced 
the issue of whether it could grant preliminary injunctive relief before deciding to 
compel arbitration.41 Acknowledging the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, 
the Fifth Circuit found that the Federal Arbitration Act provides little guidance 
regarding preliminary injunctive relief prior to a decision on whether to compel 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 RGI, Inc., 858 F.2d at 230. 
38 Id. 
39 Janvey v. Alguire, 628 F.3d 164, 169 (5th Cir. 2010). 
40 Id. at 170. 
41 Id. 
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arbitration.42 Although preserving the status quo usually has little effect on 
arbitration, the question most courts face is: How much power does a private 
agreement to arbitrate take away from the courts and place in the hands of the 
arbitrator? 
 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the First Circuit in stating that a preliminary 
injunction preserving the status quo maintains “the meaningfulness of the 
arbitration process.”43 This holding, however, is quite limited in that it only applies 
to the interim time before a court rules on a motion to compel arbitration; after the 
court compels or denies arbitration, the parties were permitted to ask the courts to 
reconsider the preliminary injunction. If arbitration were to be compelled, the 




 The circuit split between the Eighth and other circuits was brought to the 
forefront by the latest Fifth Circuit opinion in Janvey.45 The split still exists 
because while most circuits will grant a preliminary injunction in the time before 
arbitration is compelled46 the Eighth Circuit still holds that granting a preliminary 
injunction while arbitration is pending is an undue delay to the arbitration process 
and impermissible under the Federal Arbitration Act.47 Although the vast majority 
of circuits follow the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, one must still be aware of the 
contrary jurisprudence in the Eighth Circuit.48 It is important to remember that the 
courts have not focused on creating a hard and fast rule where injunctive relief is 
concerned; rather, all the courts have focused on the effect granting injunctive 
                                                 
42 Id.at 173. 
43 Id. at 174 (quoting Teradyne v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 51 (1st Cir.1986)). 
44 Janvey, 628 F.3d  at 172.   
45 Id. at 171-72. 
46 Id.  
47 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey 726 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 
1993).  
48 Janvey, 628 F.3d at 171-72. 




relief would have on the pending arbitration. This focus on the effect of granting 
injunctive relief leaves room for a compelling argument to shift either 
jurisprudence discussed infra by changing the way the effect of injunctive relief is 
framed. 
